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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judy Nield (Ms. Nield) asks the Court to reverse the District Court's decision granting 
summary judgment to Pocatello Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Pocatello Care and Rehabilitation Center 
(PCRC). This is not a complex case, despite PCRC's zealous attempt to convince the Court 
otherwise. At the end of the day, the District Court improperly weighed the evidence presented by 
Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick with PCRC's expert, Dr. Coffman. The District Court 
further misapplied the substantial factor test, in accepting all of the argument posited by Dr, 
Coffman, who, could not rule out where Ms. Nield acquired MRSA, when he testified: "I can't rule 
out where she got it[MRSA] from" and "[w]ell, I don't think we can tell." R., pp. 1013-1014 (p. 
69,1. 18 to p. 73,1. 3)(emphasis supplied). As for pseudomonas, Dr. Coffman also testified that "[lIt 
is not possible to determine when, where or how Ms. Nield became infected with MRSA or 
pseudomonas." R., p. 215 (~28)( emphasis supplied). In its brief, PCRC does not dispute that this 
was Dr. Coffman's own testimony, and his admission he could not rule out where Ms. Nield got 
MRSA and pseudomonas. This, in and of itself, raises an issue of fact for the jury to decide. 
Ultimately, the District Court invaded the province of the jury, and went well beyond its proper role 
in granting summary judgment. 
Also, the District Court improperly weighed the evidence in concluding Dr. Selznick did not 
address "the belief' of the ubiquitous nature of MRS A and pseudomonas, that Ms. Nield may have 
been a carrier of those diseases but was not infected at the time of her admission, did not explain why 
the wound culture would not have produced a false negative and "why [Ms. Nield] could only have 
contracted MRSA and pseudomonas while admitted at PCRC." R., p. 1235 [italics in original]. 
None of those conclusions are supported by the record. They were simply based on the argument 
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and supposition offered by PCRC. 
Furthermore, the District Court misapplied the substantial factor test in concluding "[Dr. 
Selznick] does not address "the belief" of the ubiquitous nature of MRS A and pseudomonas, and 
"why [Ms. Nield] could only have contracted MRSA and pseudomonas while admitted at PCRC." 
R., p. 1235 [italics in original]. Again, Ms. Nield does not have to show why she only contracted 
her infections at PCRC but that PCRC's acts and omissions were a substantial factor in her 
contracting those infections. 
PCRC attempts to diminish the fact that Dr. Selznick' s opinions were properly reached based 
on the following, unrefuted evidence: 
A. Acknowledged that he was Ms. Nield's treating physician; 
B. Reviewed Ms. Nield's medical records, including, but not limited to, the negative test 
results by the PMC medical providers and the treatment records from PCRC; 
C. Reviewed the Department of Health and Welfare ("DHW") reports that PCRC and 
its medical providers failed to follow simple infection prevention procedures, such as hand washing, 
gloving and degloving after treating MRSA and P A infected residents; 
D. Noted from the DHW records that other residents with MRSAIpseudomonas were 
housed with Ms. Nield. R., pp. 1042-1089 (Affidavit of Hugh Selznick, M.D.; Report of Dr. 
Selznick dated September 17, 2009, pp. 1-18 and Medical Record Review of Judy Nield attached 
thereto). 
Moreover, the District Court did not, despite PCRC's arguments to the contrary, say Dr. 
Selznick was not qualified to offer his opinions; rather, the Court, found Dr. Selznick qualified. 
However, the District Court, after weighing and comparing his opinions with those of Dr. Coffman, 
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improperly bought the speculation proffered by Dr. Coffman, weighed it with Dr. Selznick's 
properly reached conclusions, to find Dr. Selznick failed to rule out other causes of how Ms. Nield 
contracted MRSA and pseudomonas. The position taken by PCRC, reduced to its core argument, 
is nothing more than a disagreement with Dr. Selznick's opinions, which is not a basis upon which 
to f,'Tant summary judgment. 
Further, there is no legitimate dispute that Ms. Nield's other experts, Mr. Gerber and Ms. 
Frederick properly reached their opinions that PCRC failed to comply with state and federal 
regulations and the standard of care to prevent the transmission of disease and infection. Both Mr. 
Gerber and Ms. Frederick, after reviewing applicable regulations, the medical records of Ms. Nield's 
care, or lack thereof, at PCRC and the DHW findings, properly reached their respective opinions. 
The District Court weighed Dr. Selznick's, Mr. Gerber's and Ms. Frederick's opinions with those 
of Dr. Coffinan, and went well beyond any gatekeeper function. The District Court clearly usurped 
the province of the jury in weighing the evidence. Ms. Nield submitted admissible expert testimony, 
as well as sufficient facts establishing the "chain of circumstances" that PCRC's actions and 
omissions were a substantial factor in giving her MRSA and pseudomonas. The District Court's 
grant of summary judgment under these facts is clearly reversible error. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. MS. NIELD ESTABLISHED THE CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS 
OUTLINED IN SHERIDAN AND WEEKS. 
PCRC misses the point in its inaccurate attempt to distinguish the applicability of the 
holdings from Sheridan and Weeks to tIns case, which is that a plaintiff can establish proximate 
cause by showing a chain of circumstances. The record establishes, ViTithout legitimate dispute, Ms. 
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Nield met that standard. 
1. Proximate cause can be shown by a "chain of circumstances." 
Ms. Nield established a chain of circumstances, as set forth in Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg '1 
Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001) and Weeks v. EIRMC, 143 Idaho 834, 839, 153 P.3d 
1180, 1185 (2007), that PCRC' s actions and omissions were a substantial factor in giving her MRSA 
and pseudomonas. It must be remembered that in Sheridan, this Court held: 
Furthermore, according to our precedent, proximate cause can be shown 
from a "chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to 
be established is reasonably and naturally inferable." 
* * * 
[A plaintiff] was not required to prove his case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, nor by direct and positive evidence. It was only necessary that he 
show a chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be 
established is reasonably and naturally inferable. "If the rule of law is as 
contended for by defendant and appellant, and it is necessary to 
demonstrate conclusively and beyond the possibility of a doubt that the 
negligence resulted in the injury, it would never be possible to recover 
in a case of negligence in the practice of a profession which is not an 
exact science." [Internal citations omitted][Emphasis added]. 
Sheridan, supra, 135 Idaho at 785-86, 25 P.3d at 98-99( quoting, Formant v. Kircher, 91 Idaho 290, 
296,420 P.2d661, 667 (1966)). Likewise, in Weeksv. EIRMC, 143 Idaho 834,839,153 P.3d 1180, 
1185 (2007), proximate cause "can be shown by a 'chain of circumstances from which the 
ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable. '" Weeks, supra, 
143 Idaho at 839, 153 P.3d 1185, citing, Sheridan, supra, 135 Idaho at 785, 25 P.3d at 98 [Emphasis 
added]. 
In Weeks, supra, a medical malpractice case, this Court held that a district court erred in 
granting summary judgment, when the district court excluded expert testimony. This Court reasoned 
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that where the expert based his opinions on his experience and research, and made inferences from 
facts known to him, it was reversible error to grant summary judgment. Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 
839-40, 153 P.3d at 1185-86. Also in Weeks, this Court followed the well-settled principle that to 
survive summary judgment, the plaintiff does not need to rule out all factors, but only needs to 
establish proximate cause by showing, through a chain of circumstances, the defendant's actions and 
omissions were a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. ld., 143 Idaho 834, 839,153 P.3d 
1180, 1185 (2007). The District Court, like the one in Weeks, committed reversible error in 
weighing and assessing the credibility of Dr. Selznick's, Mr. Gerber's and Ms. Frederick's opinions 
with those of Dr. Coffman, as well as ignoring other admissible facts. 
2. Ms. Nield submitted admissible expert opinions and other evidence, thereby 
showing "the chain of circumstances" that peRC gave her MRSA and 
pseudomonas. 
The District Court abused its discretion in striking Dr. Selznick's, Mr. Gerber's and Ms. 
Frederick's affidavits, much like the district court in Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 175 P.3d 186 
(2007). In that case, the defendant physician asserted that an anesthesiologist could not testify as to 
ophthalmologic issues. This Court held the district court abused its discretion in deciding that an 
expert anesthesiologist was incompetent to testify on issues of causation relating to ophthalmology. 
Id., 145 Idaho at 28, 175 P.3d at 190. This Court reasoned that there was no requirement that an 
expert be in the same specialty as the defendant doctor. Foster, supra, 145 Idaho at 29,175 P.3d at 
191. This COUli further reasoned: "[A]n expert's specialty is not determinative .... The only 
question is whether [an expert] is qualified under Rule 702.!! ld. [Italics in original]. 
Like the district court in Foster, the District Court in this case also abused its discretion. The 
District Court acknowledged that Dr. Selznick was qualified to provide expert testimony. R., 
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p.1236. 1 Despite making that finding, the District Court stated Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. 
Fredericks could not offer opinions that will assist the jury, because they could not rule out the 
conclusions reached by Dr. Coffman. To the contrary, the record shows all of Ms. Nield's experts 
opinions are admissible, such that Ms. Nield met the substantial factor test. First, as for Dr. 
Selznick, he relied upon facts that other experts rely upon; that is, he reviewed Ms. Nield's medical 
records, including her negative test results in August of2007, and the positive results taken after her 
admission in November, 2007; he reviewed the DHW records establishing peRC's failure to follow 
infection prevention protocols; he reviewed PCRC's records of its treatment, or lack thereof, of Ms. 
Nield; and he reviewed the DHW records to find that PCRC was housing MRS A and pseudomonas 
infected residents. R., pp. 1047-1089. Based on his experience and research, like the expert witness 
in Weeks, Dr. Selznick properly concluded Ms. Nield contracted MRSA and pseudomonas due to 
peRC's actions and omissions. Again, Ms. Nield does not have to establish she only could have 
contracted MRSA or pseudomonas from peRC, only that PCRC' s conduct was a substantial factor 
in causing her injuries. Dr. Selznick's opinions establish Ms. Nield's met that test, and, at the very 
least, raised genuine issues of material fact. 
Additionally, peRC does not dispute, as it never addressed Ms. Nield's argument, that the 
District COUli mistakenly determined it was acting as a "gate keeper" arole associated with Daubert. 
It is well-established that Idaho has not adopted Daubert. Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 838,153 P.3d 
IPresumably, the District COUli also concluded that Mr. Gerber and Ms. Fredericks were 
qualified to render their opinions, as it did not state they were not qualified to give their opinions. 
R., pp. 1293-94. 
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at 1184.2 See also, Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 595 n.1, 67 P.3d 68, 74 
(2003); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998)). LR.E. 702 and 703 are 
the standards by which a court is to determine the admissibility of an expert's opinions. The District 
Court misapplied LR.E. 702 and 703 by trading the "methodology" or "reasoning" element a 
physician would use, i.e review medical records, performing research and basing an opinion on 
experience with the unfounded speculations of Dr. Coffinan, that Ms. Nield may have been a carrier 
but was not infected, and that her wound culture may have been a false negative. LR.E. 702 and 703 
only required Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick to apply their experience and review of 
records to satisfy the methodology element of the rule, which they all did. 
Further, the District Court improperly weighed the evidence when it discounted the opinions 
ofMr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick, as well as Ms. Nield's own observations establishing the "chain 
of circumstances" sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick 
concluded, from their review of Ms. Nield's deposition testimony, all of the medical records, state 
and federal regulations, PCRC's own records and the reports from DHW, that Ms. Nield contracted 
MRSA and pseudomonas due to PCRC' s failure to follow infection control prevention policies. R., 
pp. 640-653; pp. 1096-1106. Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick also concluded PCRC failed to 
2As this Court in Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 838, 153 P.3d at 1184, stated, 
The Court has not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of an 
expert's testimony but has used some of Daubert's standards in assessing 
whether the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifically valid. See Swallow 
v. Emergency 1I1ed. afIdaho, 138 Idaho 589, 595 n.l, 67 P.3d 68,74 (2003) 
("this Court has not adopted the Daubert test for admissibility"). The Daubert 
standards of whether the theory can be tested and whether it has been 
subjected to peer-review and publication have been applied, but the Court has 
not adopted the standard that a theory must be commonly agreed upon or 
generally accepted." 
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adequately train its medical care providers, and failed to provide an adequate number of staff, which 
resulted in Ms. Nield contracting MRSA and pseudomonas from PCRC. 
H must be remembered that Ms. Nield's doctors required PCRC to perform daily wound 
assessments. PCRC did not comply. PCRC did them weeklv and also incompetentlv as they 
failed to properlv document the size of the wound, what the wound looked like, and any other 
identification of the wound in the skin assessments/ ulcer sore sheets. peRC completely stopped 
documentation of two of the wounds on September 18,2007, and the largest wound on October 
22,2007, a few weeks prior to Ms. Nield testing positive for MRSA and PA. R., pp. 603-639; 
pp. 648-653; p. 678; pp.l027-1029; pp. 1095-1097; pp. 1098-1106. Furthermore, PCRC was 
found to be in violation of state and federal standards by DHW on January 24,2008. DHW 
found that the staff at PCRC could not demonstrate proper infection control policies and 
procedures when handling patients that had MRSA. R., pp. 671-673; p. 750; pp. 923-927; p. 
931. All of Ms. Nield's experts - Dr. Selznick, Ms. Frederick and Mr. Gerber considered these 
facts in reaching their respective opinions. 
Additionally, there was undisputed evidence Ms. Nield was housed in a room next to a 
resident that had MRSA and that another resident was infected with pseudomonas. R., p. 921; p. 931; 
p. 973. Ms. Nield also testified that she witnessed nurses exiting the MRSA patient's room without 
any gloves on or washing their hands. R., pp. 971-72. These facts are sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment, as they establish the chain of circumstances that may lead ajury to conclude 
Ms. Nield was infected with MRSA and PA due to PCRC's conduct and omissions. The records 
establishes Ms. Nield's case was and is appropriate for a jury to resolve, not the District Court. 
Notwithstanding PCRC' s subterfuge, it is natmally inferable Ms. Nield acquired MRSA and 
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pseudomonas due to PCRC's actions and omissions. Further, Ms. Nield established the chain of 
circumstances PCRC gave her MRSA and pseudomonas. 
3. Dr. Coffman's admissions he could not rule out where Ms. Nield got MRSA and 
pseudomonas also supports that Ms. Nield met the "chain of circumstances". 
PCRC does not dispute the fact that its own expert, Dr. Coffman admitted he could not rule 
out where Ms. Nield acquired h1RSA, when he testified: "I can't rule out where she got it from" 
and "[wJell, I don't think we can tell." R., pp. 1013-1014 (p. 69, 1. 18 to p. 73, 1. 3)(emphasis 
supplied). As for pseudomonas, Dr. Coffman also testified that "[I]t is not possible to determine 
when, where or how Ms. Nield became infected with MRSA or pseudomonas." R., p. 215 ('if 
28)( emphasis supplied). In light of these admissions, it is abundantly clear Ms. Nield met the "chain 
of circumstances" by submitting Dr. Selznick' s, Mr. Gerber's and Ms. Frederick's opinions that she 
acquired h1RSA and pseudomonas from PCRC. It is also undisputed by PCRC that all of Ms. 
Nield's experts' opinions were to a reasonable degree of pro bability, unlike Dr. Coffman, who could 
not state, by his own admission, to a reasonable degree of probability, where Ms. Nield got h1RSA 
and pseudomonas, and certainly could not rule out that she acquired h1RSA and pseudomonas from 
PCRC. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING DR. SELZNICK'S, MR. 
GERBER'S AND MS. FREDERICK'S OPINIONS. 
PCRC refers to Dr. Selznick as "Plaintiff s orthopedic expert, " a thinly veiled assertion that 
Dr. Selznick was not qualified to render the opinions he proffered in his affidavit. To the contrary, 
this District Court found that while admitting that Dr. Selznick was qualified to render his opinions 
(R., p. 1236), the District Court weighed his opinions against those submitted by PCRC's expert, Dr. 
Coffman. To reiterate, regarding expert testimony in medical malpractice cases, such testimony is 
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admissible when: 
'[TJhe expert is a qualified expert in the field, the evidence will be of 
assistance to the trier of fact, experts in the particular field would reasonably 
rely upon the same type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his 
opinion, and the probative value of the opinion testimony is not substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.' 
Coombs, supra, 148 Idaho at 140, 219 P .3d at 464 [Internal citation omitted]. Admissibility of 
an expert's opinion "depends on the validity of the expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than 
his or her ultimate conclusion." Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140,219 P.3d 453, 464(2009). 
3 Furthermore, as this Court stated in Weeks: 
Thus, '[t]he question under the evidence rule is simply whether the expert's 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon which 
the expert's opinion is based is commonly agreed upon.' 
Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 838,153 P.3d at 1184 (citing, State v. Mer"vin, 131 Idaho 642, 646,962 
P.2d 1026, 1030). 
Like the district court in Weeks, the District Court here erred in granting summary judgment, 
by excluding Dr. Selznick's, Mr. Gerber's and Ms. Frederick's opinions. Under the holding from 
Weeks, where an expert based his opinions on his experience and research, and made inferences 
from facts known to him, it was reversible error to grant summary judgment. Id., 143 Idaho at 839-
3 PCRC asserts Ms. Nield's reliance upon Coombs is misplaced. Respondent's Brief, p.37. 
PCRC's argument would have some merit, if it could have proffered evidence showing that Dr. Selznick 
did not properly utilize the appropriate methodology in reaching his opinions (which is exactly what Dr. 
Coffman did, albeit in his own admitted, speculative fashion). Dr. Selznick reviewed the records, the 
negative PMC testing, the Department of Health and Welfare repOIis citing PCRC for failing to follow 
basic disease/infection prevention procedures, the unrefuted fact that MRSA and pseudomonas residents 
were roaming the hallways at peRC, and Ms. Nield's unrefuted testimony ofPCRC nurses and staff not 
washing or degloving when leaving MRSA resident's room when attending to her. This methodology 
complies with IRE 702. 
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40, 153 P.3d at 1185-86.4 All of Ms. Nield's experts reviewed the records, reviewed the applicable 
standards for infection control, applied their experiences and made inferences from the facts in 
reaching their opinions, just like the expert in Weeks. The District Court, clearly, committed 
reversible error in granting summary judgment 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY WEIGHED THE EVIDENCE. 
PCRC incorrectly asserts the District Court only fulfilled its role as the gatekeeper in 
deciding the motion. To the contrary, the District Court impermissibly weighed the evidence when 
it accepted Dr. Coffman's conclusion that he could not detennine where Ms.Nield contracted 
MRSA or pseudomonas over Dr. Selznick's, Mr. Gerber's and Ms. Frederick's conclusions Ms. 
Nield, to a reasonable degree of probability, contracted MRSA and pseudomonas due to PCRC's 
conduct and omissions. Weighing the opinions of Dr. Coffman, Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. 
Frederick is the role of the jury, not the District Court. Essentially, the District Court detennined 
Dr. Selznick. Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick were less credible than Dr. Coffman, which PCRC does 
4PCRC improperly analogizes Ms. Nield's experts' opinions to the experts in Swallow v. 
Emergency Med. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589,67 P.3d 68 (2003). However, for the same reasons 
this Court distinguished the facts in Swallow to the expeli in Weeks, so too, should this Court 
find PCRC's analogy to Swallow improper. As PCRC notes, Swallow dealt with the issue of 
whether medication caused a heart attack. The expelis there merely relied upon reports filed by 
health care providers to the FDA that suspected a relationship to the drug and heart attacks. 
Swallow, 138 Idaho 593-94, 67 P.3d at 72-73; Weeks, 143 Idaho at 838-9, 153 P.3d at 1184-5. In 
this case, there is no allegation of medication causing Ms. Nield's infections. Rather, as Dr. 
Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick reasoned in reaching their respective opinions that Ms. 
Nield contracted I'v1RSA and pseudomonas from PCRC, Ms. Nield tested negative for MRSA and 
pseudomonas when she was admitted to PCRC; PCRC did not properly document and care for 
Ms. Nield's wounds; PCRC did not follow proper infection control prevention, as cited by the 
DHW; PCRC did not properly train its staff in infection prevention control; and Ms. Nield was 
housed next to residents with MRSA and pseudomonas. These facts were the "chain of 
circumstances" Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick relied upon in reaching their 
Opl11lOns. 
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not refute, as shown by its comments: 
THE COURT: Mr. Gabiola, I certainly want to give you the last word. I guess that's 
where I carne down with this - with Dr. Selznick, and I think: that's why I made 
mention in the decision - why I talked about that is because of the reasoning 
and methodology behind his conclusions. I just - if you look at it, it just wasn't 
enough for me to be able to say when we get to trial, this would be able to assist the 
jury at all. So that's why I really wanted to have addressed at the time of the motion 
for reconsideration, and I can understand, Mr. Larsen's position that I unjustly weighed 
the evidence against Miss Nield, but it seemed to me I had two roles in this case. I had 
to look at the evidence for purposes of summary judgment, but I also had to look at 
the evidence provided by Dr. Selznick in particular with regard to this, so I don't know 
if you want to answer or try to address that or if you have something else in mind you 
wanted to tell me, I'll turn the time to you. 
Tr., p. 91, L. 10 to p. 92, L. 8 [Emphasis supplied]. The District Court also did not review Dr. 
Selznick's affidavit and attached reports before improperly concluding that Dr. Selznick's 
methodology was. Tr., p. 92, L. 9 to p. 93, L. 22 [Emphasis supplied]. Further, Ms. Nield's counsel 
invited the District Court to review Dr. Selznick's affidavit and reports. Tr., p. 98, L. 16 to p. 99, 
L. 1. However, it appears the District Court did not do this. 
The District Court ignored the fact that Dr. Selznick did establish and conclude, through 
proper methodologies, that Ms. Nield contracted MRSA and pseudomonas from PCRC. It was 
undisputed that Dr. Selznick did the following: (1) acknowledged that he was Ms. Nield's treating 
physician; (2) reviewed Ms. Nield's medical records, including, but not limited to, the negative test 
results by the PMC medical providers and the treatment records from PCRC; (3) reviewed the DHW 
reports that PCRC and its medical providers failed to follow simple infection prevention procedures, 
such as hand washing, gloving and de-gloving after treating MRSA and pseudomonas infected 
residents; and (4) noted, from the DHW records, that other residents with MRSA/pseudomonas were 
housed with Ms. Nield. R, pp. 1047-1089. Further, it was not disputed that Mr. Gerber and Ms. 
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Frederick both reviewed all of the medical records, PCRC's own records and the reports from 
DHW. R., pp. 648-649; p. 1096; pp. 1103-1106. 
Additionally, the District Court further ignored Dr. Coffman's undisputed admission, that 
he could not rule out where Ms. Nield acquired MRSA or P A, yet concluded "Dr. Coffman . . 
.presented admissible, credible testimony establishing that [Ms. Nield] could not demonstrate to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty when, where, or how she contracted MRS A and 
pseudomonas." R., p. 1295 [Emphasis supplied]. 
The District Court committed further error when it weighed and discounted the reports and 
affidavits of Ms. Nield's other experts, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick. The District Court concluded, 
after weighing and assessing the credibility ofMr. Gerber's and Ms. Frederick's opinions that they 
both did not establish "where and how [Ms. Nield] contracted MRSA and pseudomonas." R., pp. 
1293-94. It was obvious the District Court not only improperly weighed those affidavits, but 
discounted the fact that both Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick concluded, from their review of all of 
the medical records, PCRC's own records and the reports from DHW, that Ms. Nield contracted 
MRSA and PA due to PCRC's failure to follow infection control policies and procedures. R., pp. 
648-649;p. 1096;pp. 1103-1106. 
Moreover, the Court's decision is improperly based on the speculative supposition that only 
Dr. Coffman could muster, after he most assuredly knew, based on his review of the records, 
supported the only legitimate conclusion, that Ms. Nield acquired MRSA and pseudomonas from 
PCRC. Otherwise, why would Dr. Coffman admit, that "I can't rule out where she got it from" 
and "[w] ell, I don't think we can tell." Again, summary judgment is also not appropriate, given 
Dr. Coffman cam10t rule out where Judv contracted MRSA and pseudomonas, which means Dr. 
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Coffman could not rule out that Judy contracted MRSA and pseudomonas at PCRC. This, once 
again, raises an issue of fact for the jury, not the District Court, to decide. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE 
SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST. 
To reiterate, and contrary to PCRC's position that Ms.Nield asserts expert testimony is not 
required, Ms. Nield only needs to establish a "chain of circumstances" and not that she only 
contracted MRSA and pseudomonas from PCRC. Moreover, Ms. Nield need only establish 
proximate cause that PCRC's actions and omissions were a substantial factor in bringing about her 
injuries. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464 (2009)[Emphasis added]; 
Weeks v. EIRMC, 143 Idaho 834, 839, 153 P.3d 1180,1185 (2007). Again, proximate cause "may 
be proven by direct evidence or by showing a 'chain of circumstances from which the ultimate 
fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable.' Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho 
at 839,153 P.3d 1185, citing, Sheridan, supra, l35 Idaho at 785, 25 P.3d at 98 [Emphasis added]. 
PCRC's position that there are "too many other variables" based, once again on Dr. Coffman's 
supposition is argument for the jury. The mUltiple, speculative red herrings submitted by Dr. 
Coffman, again, are for the jury to consider at trial. 
Also, the Distlict Court misconstrued the substantial factor test in requiring Ms. Nield to 
show she could only have contracted MRSA and pseudomonas from PCRC. PCRC does not dispute 
the fact that the District COUli probably got this from this Court's decision in Weeks, where the Court 
stated the following dicta in relation to a differential diagnosis case: 
The Ninth Circuit allowed for the use of differential diagnosis under Daubert 
to establish reliability of an expeli's opinion. Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1057-58. 
Differential diagnosis involves an analysis of all hypotheses that might 
explain the patient's symptoms or mortality. Id. After identifying all of the 
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potential causes of symptoms, the expert then engages in a process of 
eliminating hypotheses in order to reach a conclusion as to the most likely 
cause. Id. "When using differential diagnosis a district court is justified in 
excluding the expert's testimony if the expert fails to offer an explanation 
why an alternative cause is ruled out. Id. 
Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 849, 153 P.3d 1185. 
peRC does not refute or dispute the fact that this is not a differential diagnosis case, 
and Ms. Nield was not required to eliminate any other causes and show that she could only have 
gotten MRSA and pseudomonas from PCRC. Instead, as this Court stated, Ms. Nield only needed 
to show proximate cause, "[b]ya 'chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required 
to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable." Weeks, supra, 143 Idaho at 849, 153 
P.3d 1185. (quoting, Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'Z Med Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 785,25 P.3d 88, 98 
(2001)). 
Moreover, Dr. Selznick, along with Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick, experts in healthcare 
administration and residential care nursing, both opined, based on their review of the records, to a 
reasonable degree of probability, that PCRC failed to comply with state and federal regulations and 
standard of care to prevent the transmission of disease and infection, leading to Ms. Nield's 
contracting MRSA and pseudomonas. R., pp. 648-649; p. 1096; pp. 1103-1106 (Larsen AjJ.,Exh. 
R (Suzanne Frederick 4-19-10 & 6-10-10 Reports, pp. 9-13; Affidavit of Sid Gerber~~ 4-5, Gerber 
Report, pp. 6- 9). 
Further, PCRC offers the red herring that Mr. Gerber and Mr. Frederick are not infectious 
disease expelis. They do not have to be, as acknowledged by this Court in Foster, supra, 145 Idaho 
at 29, 175 P.3d at 191. Instead, their opinions are properly considered, in light of the "chain of 
circumstances" test. Given the negative PMC testing, the fact that PCRC was cited by DHW for 
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failing to properly follow infection prevention procedures, PCRC's failure to properly train its nurses 
and other care givers in basic infection prevention (since they failed to deglove and wash their hands, 
per Judy's umefuted testimony and the findings of the DBW) the MRSA and pseudomonas resident 
housed with Judy, PCRC's failure to test Judy, and her acquiring MRSA and pseudomonas while 
she was a resident at PCRC, lead to the natural inference Judy contracted those horrible diseases due 
to PCRC's conduct. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT GIVE MS. NIELD ANY REASONABLE 
INFERENCES. 
The record clearly shows that the District Court did not give the inference from the screening 
Ms. Nield had taken of her at PMC, prior to her admission to PCRC, that she was negative as a 
can-ier and not infected with MRSA and pseudomonas Contrary to the accepted negative test 
results, the DistrictCourt, instead, improperly gave PCRC the inference that she was a carrier and 
was potentially infected with MRSA and pseudomonas at the time of her admission. This is based 
purely on Dr. Coffman's speculation, which the District Court improperly endorsed. Further, the 
District Court gave PCRC the inference, based on the speculation proffered by Dr. Coffman, that the 
testing done by PMC may have produced a false negative. It also appears the District Court 
improperly accepted Dr. Coffman's unfounded conclusion that not all ofthe wounds were cultured 
and that Ms. Nield may have gotten MRSA or pseudomonas from visitors, which is not supported 
by the record. Those are inferences to which PCRC, as the movant, was not allowed under the 
summary judgment standard. 
Additionally, those inferences are not supported by the record. Dr. Coffman did not do the 
testing, he was not present at the testing, and no other testing is even considered to be the standard 
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of care in Pocatello. Dr. Coffman was only speculating about the test results. The record is 
appropriately silent on the testing. It was done. It was proper. It was negative for both MRSA and 
pseudomonas. R., pp. 582-594. 
Further, there is no evidence that some but not all of her wounds were cultured at the time 
of her admission to PMC. Further, the record is undisputed that PMC met its standard of care in 
testing for MRSA and pseudomonas. The tests PMC performed, which were done and used in the 
ordinary course of Ms. Nield's care and treatment, showed she was negative for MRSA and 
pseudomonas. It was not, and is not the standard of care for PMC to do any more testing than it did. 
PCRC's expert, Dr. Coffman acknowledged in his affidavit: "Screening incoming patients for 
MRSA was not common practice as of August 2007, and was not a part ofthe standard of care." R., 
p. 212 ('1[13); Tr., p. 29, L.14-24. 
PCRC does not refute that it relied on PMC's testing that Ms. Nield was negative for MRSA 
and pseudomonas at the time she was admitted to PCRC. It was also undisputed that PCRC did not 
test Ms. Nield for MRSA or pseudomonas prior to or during her stay at its facility. 
PCRC also asks this Court to consider further speculation by contending that it was possible 
Ms. Nield acquired MRSA or pseudomonas when she left the facility for treatment or that visitors 
to her room my have infected her. 5 Those "possibilities" are entirely unfounded and have no support 
in the record. Further, PCRC's argument on such matters are inferences which it, as the movant, is 
not entitled to on summary judgment. 
What is supported by the record, and which PCRC does not address, is that it failed to: 
1. Provide a copy of its Infection Control Policy and Procedure Manual to all employees. 
5Respondent's Brief, p. 3. 
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R., 664-665 (p. 21, 11. 18 to p. 22, 1. 2); p. 881 (p. 26, 1. 10-15); 
2. Did not follow its policy by failing to require and monitor its staff to do self evaluations 
and fill out Compliance Rounds Fonus every six months to ensure its staff knew of and was 
following its infection control policies. R., p. 740; pp. 864-865; pp. 903-904 (p. 24, l. 22 to p. 26, 
L 5-19). 
3. PCRC's nurses failed to demonstrate proper infection control prevention, such as hand 
washing and removing contaminated gloves from patient to patient, and were cited by DHW for 
those violations. R., pp. 671-673; pp. 923-927; 
4. Ms. Nield was housed in a dirty room, with mold in the bathroom and feces in the bed and 
sink. R., p. 970; 
5. Ms. Nield witnessed nurses that did not wash their hands or put on gloves before they 
came to her room and witnessed them leaving bandages and garbage in her room. R., p. 971. 
6. That PCRC did not have sufficient staffto meet the demands of the facility. R., p. 978; 
7. That Ms. Nield was housed next to MRS A and pseudomonas infected residents. R., pp. 
921;931;973; 1059; 
8. That Dr. Coffman admitted medical staff at some facilities only hand wash 50-60% of the 
time. R., p. 1012. 
Ms. Nield, not PCRC, was entitled to all reasonable inferences, such as: (l) that she was not 
colonized or infected with MRSA or pseudomonas, based on the negative test results from the testing 
done at PCRC; (2) that the testing did not prove a false negative; (3) that all of her wounds were 
cultured; (4) that her treating physician, Dr. Selznick, who followed the standard of care, can rely 
on test results negative for MRSA and pseudomonas; (5) that it was documented that Ms. Nield was 
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exposed to MRSA and pseuodomonas during her stay at PCRC; (6) PCRC breached the standard 
of care in failing to adhere to the standard of care for control of infectious diseases, which was 
documented by DHW; and (7) Dr. Selznick, Mr. Gerber and Ms. Frederick had aright to rely on the 
positive test results of MRSA and pseudomonas in November, 2007, to draw the conclusion that 
PCRC's conduct was a substantial factor in causing Ms. Nield's infections. The District Court 
misapplied the summary judgment standard, such that this Court must reverse and remand this case. 
F. DR. COFFMAN'S SPECULATION AND ADMISSION HE COULD NOT 
RULE OUT WHERE MS. NIELD CONTRACTED MRSA AND 
PSEUDOMONAS RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF MA TERIAL FACT, 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
PCRC contends that Dr. Coffman's opinions were admissible.6 To the contrary, Dr. 
Coffman's opinions were based on speculation and inadmissible, and the District Court abused its 
discretion in considering it. 7 
1. Standard of review for admission of affidavits. 
IRCP 56( e) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
The question of admissibility of affidavits under Rule 56( e) is a threshold question to be 
analyzed before reviewing motions for summary judgment, and a court must look at the affidavit to 
detennine ifit alleges facts, which if true, would render the testimony admissible. Foster, supra, 145 
6Respondent's Brief, pp. 43-44. 
7Ms. Nield objected to Dr. Coffman's affidavit in her Motion to Strike it. R., pp. 520-
525. 
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Idaho at 28,175 P.3d at 190 (2007). 
Expert testimony offered in a medical malpractice case, "like any other case, is governed by 
the rul es of evidence regarding the opinion testimony oflay witnesses and experts under Idaho Rules 
of Evidence 70] and 702." IRE 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
However, expert testimony that is based on speculation, is not admissible under Rule 702. 
Speculation, as it relates to expert testimony is defined as "the art of theorizing about a matter as to 
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 564, 97 
P.3d 428,432 (2004). 
An expert opinion that is speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is 
inadmissible because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or determine a fact that is at issue. Expert opinion that merely 
suggests possibilities would only invite conjecture and may be properly excluded." 
Id. [Emphasis added][Internal citations omitted]. 
2. Dr. Coffman submitted inadmissible statements. 
In paragraph 12 of Dr. Coffman's affidavit, Dr. Coffman does not identify how he is trained 
or has experience in how a technician "does not culture every micro-organism from a wound or fluid 
culture" and makes this conclusion that in every case, a technician does not perfonn a complete 
culture. R., p. 211-12; 522. This assertion is speculation, especially due to the fact that Dr. Coffman 
did not endeavor to contact the technician or obtain facts to support his unsubstantiated conclusion. 
Paragraph 14 is inadmissible speculation. Dr. Coffman again asserts supposition in 
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concluding, in the last sentence of Paragraph 14 in his statement that "it appears" that Dr. 
Zimmerman's reference in his discharge summary of Ms. Nield, to a negative MRSA screen refers 
to the culture taken, "and not an actual MRSA screening based on the lack of any MRSA screen 
report." Dr. Coffman goes on to speculate, "it is fair to assume that a MRSA screen was not 
performed." R., pp. 212-13; 522-23 [Emphasis supplied]. As previously mentioned, Dr. Coffman 
admitted that screening was not the standard of care. R., p. 212 (~13). Again, Dr. Coffman 
assumed, incorrectly, and did not endeavor to produce any facts to ascertain whether a screen and 
culture were done. Id. Dr. Coffman goes on to conclude: "If Ms. Nield was not screened for MRSA, 
it is not possible to detennine if she was MRSA colonized at the time she was admitted to Pocatello 
Care and Rehab on August 25,2007." Id. This is again supposition and conclusory speculation. 
Dr. Coffman's speculation is evident by his use of "If' indicative of his conclusory speculations. 
Paragraph 23 is based on speculative "possibility." Dr. Coffman, again, concludes, based 
on his speculation, whether each of Ms. Nield's wounds were cultured, leading to his conclusion, 
the wound culture "does not rule out the possibility Ms. Nield was colonized or infected with MRSA 
or pseudomonas." Dr. Coffman goes on to speculate, "[i]t is possible Ms. Nield had MRSA and/or 
pseudomonas in one or more, but not all of her wounds ... it is possible the swab was taken from one 
of the wounds in which she did not have MRSA and/or pseudomonas." R., p. 214; 523. The 
inadmissible nature of these statements is self-evident by Dr. Coffman's continuous use of 
"possible," which he uses several times. Again, this is speculative and conclusory, entirely void of 
any facts. 
Paragraph 24 is also based on speculation. Dr. Coffman speculates that "[i]t is possible .. 
. the culture did not grow out and identify [MRSA or pseudomonas] resulting in a false negative." 
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R., p. 214; 523. This conclusion is based on no facts. Again, Dr. Coffman does not endeavor to 
ascertain any facts to support this or his final conclusion, "It is very possible MRSA and/or 
pseudomonas were present in the wound that was cultured ... but were not dominant microorganisms 
and were not grown out." R., p. 214. This is again inadmissible speculation. 
Paragraph 26 is inadmissible speculation. Dr. Coffman concludes, without any factual bases, 
that Ms. Nield was potentially exposed to MRSA or pseudomonas when she had visitors. Lacking 
in this conclusory statement is any evidence the visitors were MRSA or pseudomonas colonized or 
infected. R., p. 215; 524. 
Finally, Dr. Coffman's affidavit must be tempered by his admissions: "I can't rule out 
where she got it from" and "[w]eU, I don't think we can tell." R., pp. 1013-1014 (p. 69,1. 18 to 
p. 73, L 3)(emphasis supplied). As for pseudomonas, Dr. Coffman testified: "[I]t is not possible to 
determine when, where or how Ms. Nield became infected with MRSA or pseudomonas." R., 
p. 215 (~28)(emphasis supplied). Based on this record, it is obvious the District Court committed 
reversible error in granting summary judgment. 
G. THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STANDARD. 
Again, the rules applying to a court's determination of summary judgment are as follows: 
As we have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for summary 
judgment, all disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the 
non-moving party. The burden of proving the absence of a material fact 
rests at all times upon the moving party. This burden is onerous because 
even" [c]ircumstantiaI evidence can create a genuine issue of material 
fact." Moreover, reasonable inferences which can be made from the 
record shall be made in favor of the party resisting the motion. If the 
record contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might 
reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied because 
all doubts are to be resolved against the moving party. The requirement 
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that all reasonable inferences be construed in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when a party moves for 
summary judgment the opposing party's case must not rest on mere 
speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue of fact. Notwithstanding the utility of a summary judgment, a 
motion for summary judgment should be granted with caution. 
McCoyv. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d360, 364 (1991)[Internal citations omitted] [Emphasis 
added]. Furthermore, it is well-established that on summary judgment, a district court is not allowed 
to weigh the evidence: 
The trial court, when confronted by a motion for summary judgment, must 
detennine if there are factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of 
facts. On such a motion it is not the function of the trial court to weigh 
the evidence or to determine those issues. Moreover, all doubts must be 
resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment. 
Merrill v. Duffj; Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410, 414,353 P.2d 657, 659 (1960)[Emphasis added]. 
See also, American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1983) ("A 
trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or resolve 
controverted factual issues.");Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 730,552 P.2d 776, 
782 (1976)(citing, Merrill, supra); Meyers v. Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 849, 993P.2d 609,612 (2000) 
("The district court may not weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues."). 
Additionally, "[a] motion for summary judgment should be denied if the pleadings, 
admissions, depositions, and affidavits raise any question of credibility of witnesses or weight of the 
evidence." Merrill, supra, 82 Idaho at414, 353 P.2d at 659. With these standards in mind, it is clear 
the District Court improperly granted summary judgment to PCRC and its decision must be reversed. 
H. MS. NIELD IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Ms. Nield is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho 
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Appellate Rules 40 and 41. PCRC was clearly not entitled to summary judgment, and the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment was unreasonable and without foundation. Thus, Ms. Nield is 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Judy Nield respectfully requests the Court reverse the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment and remand the case back to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
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